Economic information from Smart Meter: Nexus Between Demand Profile and
  Electricity Retail Price Between Demand Profile and Electricity Retail Price by Yu, Yang et al.
1Economic information from Smart Meter: Nexus
Between Demand Profile and Electricity Retail Price
Yang Yu, Student Member, IEEE, Guangyi Liu, Senior Member, IEEE, Wendong Zhu, Fei Wang, Bin Shu,
Kai Zhang, Ram Rajagopal, Member, IEEE, and Nicolas Astier.
Abstract—In this paper, we demonstrate that a consumer’s
marginal system impact is only determined by their demand
profile rather than their demand level. Demand profile clustering
is identical to cluster consumers according to their marginal
impacts on system costs. A profile-based uniform-rate price is
economically efficient as real-time pricing. We develop a criteria
system to evaluate the economic efficiency of an implemented
retail price scheme in a distribution system by comparing profile
clustering and daily-average clustering. Our criteria system can
examine the extent of a retail price scheme’s inefficiency even
without information about the distribution system’s daily cost
structure. We analyze data from a real distribution system in
China. In this system, targeting each consumer’s high-impact
days is more efficient than target high-impact consumers.
Index Terms—Demand profile, marginal system impacts, retail
price, clustering, distribution system
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumers’ daily demand profiles fundamentally links with
the cost of serving them in a distribution network system
(DS) [1]. A consumer’s daily demand profile is their hourly
electricity demand across a day, measured from a smart meter.
The aggregated demand profile in a DS determines the DS’s
daily system cost and associated emissions [2]. Most current
retail price designs are based on demand levels rather than
demand profiles. For example, a retail electricity bill in most
current U.S. markets includes two parts: a tiered price for
electricity energy consumption, and a fixed charge to balance
the utility’s budget for fixed costs and other service costs [3].
Both parts are independent of a consumer’s demand profile.
The lack of information about individual users’ electricity
demand patterns limits retail price designs and demand re-
sponse project targets. Before smart meters collect individual
consumers’ demand profiles, retail-price designs and demand
response projects are designed on the basis of two assumptions
[4]. One is that all consumers have very similar electricity
usage patterns. The other is that the supply cost curve is
convex. These two assumptions lead to the conclusion that the
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marginal system cost of serving a consumer monotonically in-
creases with their demand level. For example, the tiered-price
scheme charges consumers whose monthly total demand levels
exceed a given threshold at a higher rate than other users.
The demand charge also prices consumers only according to
their peak demand levels in a month no matter when their
peak demands occur. These ”demand-level based” policies are
efficient only if the assumption that consumers’ usage patterns
are homogeneous is true. Unfortunately, this assumption is
rejected by the empirical data analyses on smart meter data.
Researchers have found remarkable heterogeneity in con-
sumers’ daily demand profiles in transmission systems [5].
[6] demonstrates that annual consumers’ demand profiles in
PG&E can be clustered into more than 200 types. The het-
erogeneity in consumers’ daily-demand profiles suggests that
we should analyze the difference in marginal costs in serving
various consumers, examine the relation between consumers’
marginal system impacts and their demand profiles and levels,
and reconsider our current retail-pricing scheme.
Consumer daily demand profiles provide our information
about features impacting consumption behaviors, such as
temperature [7] [8] [9] [10] [11]. Demand profiles are also
used for improving the accuracy of demand forecasts [12] [13]
[14] [15]. A lot of studies try to target consumers for demand
management on the basis of demand profiles [16] [17] [18]
[19].
However, we still lack an economic explanation for con-
sumers’ heterogeneous but clustered demand profiles. Conse-
quently, it is unclear how the profile clustering results can
be used for distribution system market designs and demand
response project developments. Two core questions must be
answered before consumer profile information can be fully
used to design retail contracts and demand response projects.
How do a consumer’s demand level and profile impact the
distribution system’s cost of serving this consumer? What is
the relation between consumers’ profile clustering and their
impacts on a distribution system’s costs?
Understanding the relation between consumer demand pro-
file and the system cost is the foundation for the framework
to analyze the profitability of serving a consumer, assess
the efficiency of the retail price design or demand response
project, and examine the quality of demand-response resources
in a DS. In this paper, we explain the economic nexus
between consumer’s demand profile, marginal system cost, and
economically optimal daily average retail rate. This economic
explanation is also used to develop criteria to assess the eco-
nomic inefficiency and association impacts of an implemented
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2retail price scheme in a DS. The rest of the paper is organized
as follow: Sec II includes the theoretical discussion about
consumer demand profile and marginal system impacts; we
explain the nexus between demand profile clustering and daily-
average-rate clustering in Sec III; then, we develop criteria
to assess a retail-price design in Sec IV; Sec V summarize
our empirical analysis on a China’s DS; Sec VI includes a
discussion about the empirical studies and concludes the whole
paper.
II. LOAD PROFILE CLUSTERING, MARGINAL SYSTEM
IMPACT AND PRICING DESIGN
A. A consumer’s marginal system impacts
We examine a DS that serves N consumers whose hourly
demands are positive. Consumer i’s daily demand is denoted
by
−→
Li = (li1, ..., lih, ...li24)
24
h=1 ∈ R24, where lih is consumer
i’s hourly demand in hour h.
The summation of all consumers’ demands is the DS’s daily
system aggregated demand
−→
L =
∑N
i=1
−→
Li, which determines
the DS’s daily system cost and emissions. The daily cost
C(
−→
L ), as well as emissions, is determined by not only the
total amount of electricity demand but also by various features
of
−→
L ’s profile, including peak level, peak time and ranges of
ramps. For example, C(
−→
L ) is high when
−→
L has a big evening
ramp, such as California’s ”duck-curve” concerns. We assume−→
L has M features that impact the system cost and use φj to
represent the jth feature. The feature φj is a function of
−→
L . In
this section, we examine the marginal impact of a consumer’s
daily demand on the daily cost C(
−→
L ) through the impact on−→
L ’s profile features.−→
L and its features change when consumer i increases their
demand and keeps their daily demand profile the same, which
means that this additional electricity demand is proportion-
ally allocated into 24 hours according to i’s daily demand
profile.
−→
L ’ features determine the daily system cost. Thus,
Consumer i’s profile-keeping demand growth will change the
DS’s daily system cost. The marginal system daily cost caused
by consumer i’s daily electricity demand is the derivative of
the system daily cost along
−→
Li.
We define i’s marginal system feature impacts (MFIs) and
marginal system cost impact (MCI) as the marginal changes
of
−→
L ’s profile features and system costs corresponding to
−→
Li’s
profile-keeping demand growth.
Definition Consumer i’s marginal system feature impact on
φj is
MFIi,j = ∇−→Liφ(
−→
L )
= lim
∆→0
φj(
−→
L + ∆
−→
Li
‖−→Li‖1
)− φj(−→L )
∆
. (1)
Here, ‖ • ‖1 is the l1 norm of R24. Correspondingly, the
marginal system-cost impact of consumer i’s daily demand is
MCIi = ∇−→LiC(
−→
L )
=
M∑
j=1
(
∂C
∂φj
MFIi,j). (2)
Here, ∂C∂φj is feature φj’s marginal system-cost impact.
MFIs and MCI are sensitive to the demand profile rather
than demand level. We refer two daily demands
−→
Li and
−→
Lk
share the same demand profile if they are linearly correlated. If
two consumers’ daily demands share the same demand profile,
they have the same MFIs and MCI even if they consume
different amounts of electricity.
Theorem II.1. If
−→
Li and
−→
Lk are linearly correlated, con-
sumers i and k share the same MFIs and MCI.
Proof: Assume consumers i and k have the same demand
profile. Their daily demands are linearly correlated such that
α
−→
Li =
−→
Lk, where α is a positive constant. ∀j,
MFIi,j = lim
∆→0
φj(
−→
L + ∆
−→
Li
‖−→Li‖1
)− φj(−→L )
∆
.
= lim
∆→0
φj(
−→
L + ∆ α
−→
Li
‖α−→Li‖1
)− φj(−→L )
∆
.
= lim
∆→0
φj(
−→
L + ∆
−→
Lk
‖−→Lk‖1
)− φj(−→L )
∆
.
= MFIk,j .
Because MFIi,j = MFIi,k for all j, we conclude that
MCIi = MCIk.
Theorem II.1 is the economic explanation for consumer
profile clustering.
Lemma II.2. Demand profile clustering actually clusters
consumers according to their MFIs and MCI. Consumers in
the same profile cluster share the same MFIs and MCI.
B. Consumer demand profile and economic retail price
Consumer MCI is fundamentally correlated with the eco-
nomically optimal retail price. A retail price design that
charging consumers according to their MCIs is economically
optimal. If consumers pay their daily bill by a rate equal to
MCIi, we refer this price scheme as ”profile price menu”
(PPM). PPM actually proposes consumers a menu of pairs
(profile, daily flat price) and lets consumers select demand
profile from the menu. PPM is equivalent to charging con-
sumers by real-time hourly prices (RTPs), in two ways. First,
PPM gives each consumer the same economic incentive as
the RTPs. Second, PPM and RTPs lead to the same market
equilibrium in the DS, which means consumer demands and
system costs and emissions are the same. In the following
theorem, we demonstrate the foundation
Theorem II.3. Charging consumers according to the PPM
provides every consumer the same incentive in all hours and
consequently leads to the same market equilibrium as charging
consumers the RTPs in a DS system. Therefore, PPM is also
the economically efficient retail price.
Proof: Our demonstration includes three steps. First, we
build the linkage between consumer’s MCI and the RTPs.
Then, we demonstrate that the PPM and RTP provide the same
incentives to every consumer when they decide their hourly
3demand level. Finally, we demonstrate that the same individual
economic incentives lead to the same market equilibrium.
Step 1: We use λh to represent the wholesale RTP in hour
h and
−→
Λ = (λ1...λ24) to represent the RTPs in the whole day.
The daily system cost is
−→
Λ · −→L ᵀ. Thus, consumer i’s MCI
MCIi = ∇−→LiC(
−→
L ) = ∇−→
Li
−→
Λ · −→L ᵀ
=
−→
Λ∇−→
Li
· −→L ᵀ =
24∑
h=1
li,h∑24
h=1 li,h
λh. (3)
Here, li,h is consumer i’s consumption during hour h. Thus,
MCI is a weighted average of the RTPs, where the weight for
each hour’s price is the proportion of the hourly demand to
the daily total demand.
Step 2: We use Ui(li,1, ..., li,24) to represent consumer
i’s utility function. Given the PPM, consumer i pays
MCIi(li,1, ..., li,24) for demanding one unit of electricity.
MCIi(li,1, ..., li,24) is a function of li,h. Thus, consumer
i’s hourly demands are solved from the following welfare
maximization problem
max
(li,h,∀i)
Ui(li,1, ..., li,24)−MCIi(li,1, ..., li,24)×
24∑
m=1
li,m
(4)
Therefore, the first order conditions are
∂Ui(li,1, ..., li,24)
∂li,h
=
∂MCIi
∂li,h
×
24∑
m=1
li,m︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+MCIi︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
,∀h. (5)
The left hand side of Eq. (5) is consumer i’s marginal utility
of demanding li,h in hour h, which includes two parts. Term A
is the marginal impact of li,h on all hourly costs by affecting
the rate MCIi. Term B is the marginal impact of li,h on the
cost for hour h by varying the demand level. The summation
of Term A and B is the RTP for hour h.
∂MCIi
∂li,h
×
24∑
m=1
li,m +MCIi.
=
λh
∑
m 6=h li,m −
∑
m6=h λmli,m
(
∑24
m=1 li,m)
2
×
24∑
m=1
li,m
+
24∑
m=1
li,m∑24
m=1 li,m
λm = λh (6)
Therefore, Eq. (5) is equivalent to
∂Ui(li,1, ..., li,24)
∂li,h
= λh,∀h. (7)
When the RTP is implemented in the DS, consumer i’s welfare
maximization problem is
max
(li,h,∀i)
Ui(li,1, ..., li,24)−
24∑
h=1
λhli,h (8)
The first order conditions of Eq. (8) are also Eq. (7). Thus,
the PPM and RTP provide the same economic incentives to
consumer i in all hours.
Step 3: When all consumers are price takers, the RTP
in hour h λh(
−→
L ) is a function of only the aggregate de-
mand, and is not affected by individual consumer demands.
Therefore, the supply cost of the whole DS is C(
−→
L ) =∑24
h=1 λh(
−→
L )
∑
i=1N . Consequently, for both PPM and RTP
scenarios, the market equilibrium of all hours are solved from
∂Ui(li,1, ..., li,24)
∂li,h
= λh(
−→
L ),∀i, h. (9)
Therefore, the PPM and RTPs lead to the same market
equilibrium. Because the RTPs are the economically optimal
retail price, the PPM is also economically optimal.
III. PROFILE CLUSTERING AND DAILY-AVERAGE RATE
CLUSTERING
The economic optimality of the PPM scheme indicates the
economic essence of consumer demand profile clustering. The-
orems II.1 and II.3 together indicate that consumers sharing the
same demand profile pay the same daily rate under the PPM
scheme. Therefore, consumers in the same demand-profile
cluster pay the same rate when the PPM is implemented.
Because of the economic linkage between the PPM daily
rate and RTPs demonstrated in the proof of Theorems II.3,
consumers in the same demand-profile cluster also pay the
same daily average rate when the RTPs are used.
Corollary III.1. Consumers in the same demand-profile clus-
ter pay the same daily average rate when the RTPs or PPM
is implemented.
The conclusion in Corollary III.1 can be generalized to any
economically optimal price scheme in the following theorem,
which is the core conclusion of this paper. In this theorem,
we conclude that an implemented retail price is economi-
cally optimal if and only if every consumer’s average daily
rate calculated according to the implemented retail price is
their MCI. Consequently, if an economically optimal price
scheme is implemented, the partition of consumers according
to consumer demand profiles is a refinement of the partition of
consumers according to daily average rates. When consumers
in two clusterings have different MCIs, the two partitions must
be the same.
Theorem III.2. A price scheme is economically optimal if
and only if every consumer’s daily average rate is their MCI.
Therefore, an economically optimal price will lead consumers
who share the same demand profile to pay the same daily
average rate even if they have different demand levels.
Proof: Theorem II.3 has proved the sufficiency. Here, we
prove the necessarily.
We assume that Γ is an economically optimal price scheme.
The average daily rate of consumer i is γi, which is a function
of consumer i’s hourly demands and can differ between
consumers. Consequently, consumer i chooses their hourly
demands under the price scheme Γ by solving from the
following welfare optimization problem.
max
(li,h,∀i)
Ui(li,1, ..., li,24)− γi(li,1, ..., li,24)
24∑
m=1
li,m (10)
4Then, consumer i’s hourly demand bundle is solved from the
first order conditions.
∂Ui(li,1, ..., li,24)
∂li,h
=
∂γi
∂li,h
24∑
m=1
li,m + γi,∀h. (11)
Because γ is economically optimal, ∂Ui(li,1,...,li,24)∂li,h must be
equal to λh. Consequently, according to Cauchy-Kovalevskaya
Theorem, the Eq. (11) has a unique analytic solution near
(λ1, ..., λ24). Because MCIi is a solution of Eq. (11), γi must
be equal to MCIi.
IV. CRITERIA TO ASSESS THE PERFORMANCE OF AN
IMPLEMENTED RETAIL PRICE SCHEME IN A DS
The economic linkages connecting the consumer demand
profile, the MCI, and the economically optimal price scheme
are useful to assess the economic performance of an imple-
mented retail price scheme in a DS. We can directly induce
the most important corollary of this paper from Theorem III.2,
which allows us to develop a sequence of criteria to assess
how different a current price scheme is from the economically
optimal price scheme.
Corollary IV.1. When the implemented price scheme in a DS
is economically optimal, the partition of consumers according
to their demand profile must be a refinement of the partition of
consumers according to their daily average rate. If consumers
with two demand profiles always have different MCIs, those
two partitions must be the same.
Proof: Assume consumer i and k belong to the same
demand profile cluster ωp, we demonstrate that i and k
also must belong to the same daily-average-rate cluster ωr
when the implemented retail price is economically optimal.
Theorem II.1 demonstrates that
i, k ∈ ωp ⇒MCIi = MCIk
If i and k pay different daily average rate ri 6= rk, we
conclude either ri 6= MCIi or rk 6= MCIk, which is
contradictory with the assumption that the implmented price
is economically optimal according to Theorem III.2. Thus, i
and k must pay the same daily average rate and belong to the
same daily-average-rate cluster ωr
Corollary IV.1 allows us assess the economic efficiency
to a large extent even if the information about the RTPs is
completely unknown.
When consumers with two demand profiles always have
different MCIs, the mismatch of the partition of consumers
according to demand profiles denoted by Ωp and the partition
of averagely daily rates Ωr is a measurement of the efficiency
of an implemented retail price scheme. The partition Ωp must
be identical to the partition Ωr. Otherwise, the implemented
price must not be economically optimal. Simultaneously, the
difference between Ωp and Ωr indicates how different is the
implemented price scheme from an economically optimal price
scheme. The larger the difference, the more inefficient the
implemented price scheme.
When consumer’s MCI is injective function of their demand
profile, we define the ”the degree of consistency between the
implemented price scheme and an economically optimal price
design” as the difference between Ωp and Ωr. In the DS
discussed in above two sections, we assume that consumers are
clustered into T profile types and S daily-average-rate types.
We use t to represent the tth type of demand-profile type
ωp,t ∈ Ωp and s to represent the sth type of daily-average-rate
type ωr,s ∈ Ωr.
Definition The the degree of consistency between the imple-
mented price and an economically optimal price in the DS
is
DOC =
2×∑Tt=1∑Ss=1 ρts log2 ρtsρtρs
−∑Tt=1 ρt log2 ρt −∑Ss=1 ρs log2 ρs ,
if ρtρs < 1
=1, otherwise (12)
Here,
ρt =
|ωp,t|
N
, ρs =
|ωr,s|
N
, and ρts =
|ωp,t ∩ ωr,s|
N
.
|ωp,t| is the number of consumers having tth demand profile.
|ωr,s| is the number of consumers paying sth daily average
rate. |ωp,t ∩ ωr,s| is the number of consumers that have tth
demand profile and pay sth daily average rate.
DOC is the normalized mutual information between Ωp and
Ωr. DOC measures how much the diversity of a consumer’s
daily average rate is reduced by when knowing this consumer’s
daily profile. When the implemented price scheme is economi-
cally optimal, DOC is equal to 1, which means that Ωp and Ωr
are identical. DOC is equal to 0 if Ωp and Ωr are independent
of each other, which is the worst case. The higher the value of
DOC, the more efficient the implemented retail price scheme
for the DS.
It is rare that consumers with different profiles have the
same MCI. Therefore, DOC can be broadly used for various
DSs and markets.
DOC can measure the extent of efficiency of the imple-
mented retail price even if we have no information about the
system daily cost C(
−→
L ). When more information about C(
−→
L )
is revealed, further measurements can be established to assess
the economic efficiency and impacts in more detail.
If we know that C(
−→
L ) is monotonically increasing with
a linear combination of
−→
L ’s M features {φj , j = 1...M},
we can measure the economic distortion caused by the imple-
mented retail price even if we do not know the exact form
of C(
−→
L ). Assume that system cost C(
−→
L ) is monotonically
increased with
∑M
j=1 µjφj , where µj > 0. Consumer i’s
MCI is monotonically increased with Φi =
∑M
j=1 µjMFIi,j .
When a economically optimal price scheme is implemented,
consumer i pays a higher daily rate than consumer j if and
only if Φi > Φj . Therefore, we call Φi as the ”MCI index”.
We can sort consumers in a list according to the ascending
order of their MCI index. If this list is different from the
list of consumers that is sorted in the ascending order of
daily average rates ri, then the implemented retail price is
not economically optimal. The more different the two lists,
the more distortion caused by the implemented retail price.
5We use the KenDall tau distance to measure the extent of
distortion caused by an implemented retailed market price.
Definition We define the distortion caused by the imple-
mented retail price
Dt =
|{(Φi,Φj)|Φi > Φj ∧ ri < rj}|
N(N − 1)/2 × 100%. (13)
If we have complete information about the function of
C(
−→
L ), such as the local marginal pices. we can accurately
measure the inefficiency of the implemented retail price.
Consumer i is subsidized by the implemented price scheme
if MCIi > λi and taxed if MCIi < λi. The amount of
money subsidized to consumer i is (MCIi−λi)×
∑24
h=1 li,h.
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ON A CHINESE DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM
A. Data background and processing
We use real smart meter data from an industrial county
of one of the largest cities in China to analyze consumer
marginal system impacts and assess the effectiveness of the
current retail price scheme in this distribution system. In this
city, there are 2, 110 consumers, all of whom are equipped
with smart meters. The data ranges from January 2014 to
December 2014 and consists of the electricity consumption
of commercial, industrial and residential customers measured
at 1-hour intervals. The total number of daily demand profiles
is 516, 494.
This county is representative of a Chinese distribution
system. In contrast with the United States, China’s electric-
ity demand is mostly determined by large commercial and
industrial consumers. 70% of China’s electricity is consumed
by industrial and commercial sectors [20]. In addition, most
distribution systems in China usually simultaneously serve
industrial, commercial, and residential consumers. In contrast
with residential consumers, large industrial and commercial
consumers are easier to be managed individually and priced
differently. In the distribution system studied in this paper, the
majority of consumers are industrial and commercial compa-
nies. But there are still a significant number of residential and
public-service users.
We normalized daily demand profiles and use an adaptive
k-means algorithm to cluster all normalized daily demand
profiles into 36 profile types using the elbow method [2]. In
each cluster, the euclidean distance from a demand profile to
the cluster kernel is less than 5% of the l2 norm of the cluster
kernel [21] [22].
We calculate every consumers’ MFIs for the system-
aggregated daily demand profile’s morning ramp range,
evening ramp range, and peak demand level, which are rep-
resented by MFIMR, MFIER, and MFIPD). China does
not have a wholesale electricity market and has a fully-
regulated wholesale price scheme. Consequently, the system
cost is determined mainly by the three features we analyzed.
According to Theorem II.1, we only need to calculate each
profile type’s MFIs instead of calculating each person’s MFIs.
Therefore, the computing load is significantly reduced.
(a) System aggregated demand profile
(b) Aggregated demand profile of Type-6 con-
sumers
Fig. 1. Type-6 consumer’s MFIMR is negative on April 18th, 2014
B. Consumers’ marginal system impacts
MFIs provide us the information about whose consumption
were more responsible for the aggregate load profile’s ramps
or peak demands. For a given feature, consumers’ MFIs
are significantly various. In the Appendix, we present the
histograms of MFIMR, MFIER, and MFIPD.
Some consumers have negative MFIMR and MFIER on
particular days. Those consumers’ consumption are very valu-
able in moderating aggregate load’s morning or evening ramps
on those days. If those consumers demand more electricity and
keep their demand profiles, the aggregate demand will lead
to more moderate morning or evening ramps. For instance,
Type 6’s demand was ramping down when the aggregate
demand was experiencing the morning ramp on April 18th,
2014 (Fig. 1). Consequently, Type 6 had a negative MFIMR
in this day.
Consumer demands affect the distribution system’s cost
through different dynamics. The costs serving some consumers
are mainly caused by dealing with their morning ramps while
the cost serving other consumers are mainly due to their
impacts on system’s evening ramps or peak demands. In Fig.
2, we plot the MFIs of two types of consumers on March 24th.
System costs for dealing with the morning ramps are more due
to Type 16’s rather than Type 20’s consumption. System costs
for dealing with the evening ramps and peak loads are more
due to Type 20’s rather than Type 16’s consumption.
Understanding the long-term distributions of a consumer’s
MFIs is necessary to examine how expensive it is to serve
this consumer and where the expense comes from. The long-
6Fig. 2. Type-16 and Type-20 consumer’s MFIs for three features
term distributions of consumers are also useful for planning
a distribution system’s facilities and assets, such as the size
of transformers. We summarize the means and standard devia-
tions of every type of consumer MFIs for three features in Fig.
3. Serving some consumers is less expensive on average than
serving others. For example, Type 1 consumers have lower
average MFIs for all three features than Type 3 consumers, so
serving Type 1 is less expensive than serving Type 3.
Many consumer-profile types have MFIs with significant
fluctuations. For example, the mean of Type 3’s MFIMR is
nearly 10 times larger than its 25% quantile value. MFIPD
has smaller within-type variation than MFIMR and MFIER.
The heterogeneities of MFIMR and MFIER are mainly
within types rather than between types. In contrast, MFIPD
has more significant cross-type heterogeneity than MFIMR
and MFIER. The significant within-type variation of MFIs is
caused by the big difference between daily aggregated demand
levels and profiles. If two days have different aggregated
demand levels or profiles, the same profile type has different
MFIs of the same given feature in these two days.
We also note that the variation of consumer MFIs are
positively correlated with the absolute value of the mean
of their MFIs. Consumers that have significantly higher or
lower average marginal system impacts usually also have
significantly varying system impacts. In the Appendix, we
provide the scatter plots of average MFIs and the associated
standard deviations.
We note that nearly all profile types have both negative and
extreme high positive MFIMR and MFIER. Therefore, every
type of consumers can be valuable in moderating system ramps
in some ”particular days” while their demands significantly
aggravate system ramps in some other days. For example, Type
33 had the highest average MFIMR. However, this type still
had negative MFIMR in 5% of days.
C. Consumer demand level and marginal system impacts
Besides implementing ”demand-level based” prices, China’s
energy management has a long-term principle that is ”manage
large consumers only”. Consequently, most demand-response
projects in China are designed to target only large consumers
[23] [24] [25] [26]. However, we have demonstrated that a
consumer’s MCI is determined by their demand profile rather
(a) Distributions of MFIMR in each profile type
(b) Distributions of MFIER in each profile type
(c) Distributions of MFIPD in each profile type
Fig. 3. Variations of three MFIs within and between consumer profile types
than demand level. Consumers’ MCIs are not necessarily
positively correlated with their demand levels. Thus, ”demand-
level based” prices or ”manage large consumers only” prin-
ciple are efficient in reducing system cost only if consumers’
MCIs happen to be positively correlated with their demand
levels in a DS.
In our studied distribution system, consumers’ MCIs are not
positively correlated with their demand levels. In Fig. 4 , we
plot the correlation between consumers’ demand levels and
their MFIMR. Many large consumers have smaller MFIMR
than small consumers. We note that MFIMR’s variations
significantly increase when consumers’ demand levels exceed
a certain level. The correlations between consumers’ demand
7Fig. 4. Correlation between consumer’s MFIMR and demand level
levels and their MFIER and MFIDR have the similar
behaviors as shown in the Appendix. Therefore, it is highly
inefficient to implement ”demand-level based” policies or
”manage large consumers only” principle in this DS.
D. Assess the efficiency of the implemented retail-price
scheme
The price scheme in this distribution system is complicated.
We summarize the price scheme in the Appendix. In general,
commercial and industrial consumers were charged a time-of-
use tied price. Residential and public-service consumers had
a flat rate.
We do not have detailed information about the daily cost
structure of this distribution system because China does not
have a wholesale market. Therefore, we use the DOC index
defined in Sec. IV to examine the efficiency of the current
retail price scheme.
We calculate each consumer’s daily average rates. Be-
cause average rates are distributed continuously between 0.35
Yuan/kWh to 0.87 Yuan/kWh, we equally split [0.35, 0.87]
to 36 segments, which is the number of consumers’ profile
types, and cluster consumers into the same average-daily-rate
type if their average-daily rates are in the same segment. By
comparing the two clusters, We calculate the daily DOC index
of the current retail price scheme and summarize the monthly
average of each weekday in Fig. 5(a).
The retail price scheme is very different from an econom-
ically optimal price. The highest daily DOC index in these
11 months is only 0.3825, which is far less than 1. Therefore,
the randomness in daily average rates can only limitedly be
reduced if we know a consumer’s daily profile on a particular
day. We can conclude that the current retail price scheme is
really inefficient even though we do not know this DS’s daily
cost structures.
The extent of retail price inefficiency varies by month. As
shown in Fig. 5(a), the retail price scheme was most efficient
during weekdays in summer.
We assume the daily system cost is monotonically increas-
ing with MFIMR + MFIER + MFIPD and calculate the
daily Dt index. Under our assumptions, the current retail
price scheme created significant distortion in this distribution
(a) Daily DOC of the current retail price
(b) Daily Dt of the current retail price
Fig. 5. Economic inefficiency and distortion of the current retail price
system. 40% to 60% consumers pay a higher rate than their
neighbors whose MCIs are higher.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION: MANAGE CONSUMERS
ACCORDING TO THEIR MARGINAL SYSTEM IMPACTS
In this paper, we explain how a distribution system’s daily
cost and associated emissions are affected by consumer daily
demand profiles. We clarify that a consumer’s marginal system
impacts are determined by their demand profile rather than
their demand level. Thus, profile-based consumer clustering
clusters consumers according to their marginal system impacts.
We also demonstrate that a consumer’s daily marginal system
cost impact is the economically optimal daily average rate.
If we design a profile price scheme whose rate is equal to
consumer’s daily marginal system cost impact, the profile
price is equivalent to real-time pricing and is an economically
optimal price scheme.
We indicate that clustering demand profile is identical to
cluster consumers according to their marginal system impacts.
When consumers with various demand profiles have different
marginal impacts on the system daily cost, demand profile
clustering is identical to daily-average-rate clustering only if
8the implemented price is economically optimal, . Based on
these theoretical analyses, we develop a criteria system to
evaluate the economic efficiency of an implemented retail
price scheme in a distribution system. Our criteria system can
examine the extent of a retail price scheme’s efficiency even
if we do not have information about the distribution system’s
daily cost structure. These criteria can also be used to target
consumers who overpay or underpay for their electricity usage.
We analyze data from a real distribution system in China and
examine consumer marginal system impacts and the efficiency
of the retail price scheme there. The empirical results deepen
our insights and understanding about the multi-dimensional
marginal system impacts of consumers. The results strongly
suggest that we redesign current retail price schemes and
rethink the principles used to direct demand-response project
designs.
In general, the design for retail price or demand-response
projects needs to be smarter by considering the following three
issues.
First, it is very valuable for a distribution system operator
or utility to accurately target and manage ”particular days” in
which a profile type’s MFIs are extremely low or high. Fig. 3
demonstrates that there are a small number of ”particular days”
for each profile type. Thus, every consumer will be affected
in very few days if system operators or utilities target and
manage ”particular days”. However, in these small number
of ”particular days”, it is either very valuable or extremely
expensive to serve the corresponding type of consumers.
Therefore, distribution systems can significantly improve eco-
nomic and environmental performance by developing demand
management projects for ”particular days” for each profile
type.
Second, the large within-type variations of MFIs remind us
that demand management, including retail pricing design, must
make a trade-off between long-term mean and variation of
consumer’s system impacts. In the studied distribution system
in our research, consumers that have small MFIs usually have
stable MFIs over days. For these consumers, their retail rate
can be stable in the whole year. In contrast, complicated
designs for retail price rates or demand-response projects are
necessary to manage consumers whose MFIs are large and
significantly varying.
Finally and most importantly, the ”marginal system impact
based” principle should replace the ”demand level based” prin-
ciple in order to optimize demand management. Consumers’
”marginal system impacts” reflects which consumption behav-
iors are expensive to serve and need to be the foundation of
retail price designs.
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